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Is	there	a	connection	between	the	Northwest	Passage	and	the	South	China	Sea?		For	centuries	the	political	struggle	over	the	legal	status	of	global	oceans	was	presented	as	one	of	mare	clausum	vs.	mare	liberum.	These	concepts	concerned	the	possibility	of	movement	as	well	as	rights	and	responsibilities	of	seafaring	nations	and	coastal	states	which	had	sometimes	been	the	subject	of	small-scale	physical	confrontations	at	sea,	such	as	the	so-called	Cod	or	Turbot	Wars,	but	also	of	judicial	processes,	such	as	the	Corfu	
Channel	or	Fisheries	cases,	which	followed	earlier	conflicts.	Overcoming	confrontations	such	as	these,	progress	was	achieved	after	nine	long	years	of	negotiating	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS)	between	1973-1982.	Since	entering	into	force	in	1994	UNCLOS	has	provided	a	constitution-like	framework	with	which	to	quell	physical	confrontations	and	opened	an	institutionalized	path	for	settling	disputes	and	open	questions	through	one	of	its	three	organizations	(the	International	Tribunal	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea,	the	International	Seabed	Authority,	and	the	Committee	on	the	Limits	of	the	Continental	Shelf)	or	through	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration.	Given	these	developments	during	the	last	two	decades,	it	may	be	possible	to	speak	of	mare	
iudicatum	or	administratum	as	the	new	development	towards	a	peaceful	use	of	global	oceans.		The	point	of	this	contribution	is	to	remind	ourselves	as	academics	and	practitioners	that	as	progressive	as	this	development	may	appear,	it	should	be	clear	that	the	new	order	does	not	assert	itself	through	an	invisible	force	that	is	inherent	in	the	provisions	of	UNCLOS	and	the	procedural	rules	of	different	organizations	charged	with	its	implementation.	Much	depends	on	what	happens	in	the	day-to-day	instantiation	of	it	through	the	activity	of	seafarers	and	their	states.	Although	these	activities	may	be	small-scale	and	local	events,	there	is	a	chance	of	global	reverberations,	which	is	what	this	contribution	is	arguing:	because	in	a	global	framework	there	can	be	no	extra-ordinary	events	and	localities,	they	all	matter	for	the	overall	architecture.			In	order	to	demonstrate	this,	I	will	revert	to	two	current	examples:	the	passage	of	the	
Crystal	Serenity	through	the	Northwest	Passage	(NWP),	on	the	one	hand,	and	politics	in	the	South	China	Sea	(SCS),	on	the	other.	Remote	as	they	may	seem	in	geographical	terms	and	as	they	are	treated	as	such	by	area	specialists,	there	is	a	wider	issue	at	stake	which	connects	them,	centering	on	the	peaceful	use	of	global	oceans.		Currently,	the	Crystal	Serenity	is	making	its	way	through	the	isles	of	the	NWP.	A	subsidiary	of	a	Chinese	company,	the	organizers	are	confident	that	they	have	found	a	viable	business	model	and	are	already	offering	places	on	a	similar	journey	for	August	2017.	Ongoing	discussions	about	the	potential	environmental	impact	in	pristine	Arctic	waters	aside,	the	passage	links	to	previous	practices	of	the	USA	which	sought	to	assert	the	status	of	the	NWP	as	an	international	straight	in	the	sense	of	the	law	of	the	sea	in	1969	and	1985.	Efforts	to	send	icebreakers	from	one	ocean	to	the	other	were	met	by	Canadian	resistance	which	applied	both	legal	and	administrative	cunning:	Canada	granted	permission	to	pass	and	sent	accompanying	icebreakers,	which	the	US	had	
explicitly	not	sought,	and	later	enacted	the	Arctic	Waters	Pollution	Prevention	Act	while	claiming	that	the	NWP	constituted	internal	waters.	While	the	Crystal	Serenity	is	not	practicing	what	UNCLOS	refers	to	as	freedom	of	navigation	(FON),	the	organisers	have	sought	British,	not	Canadian	icebreaking	support.	The	voyage	thus	demonstrates	the	navigability	of	the	passage	and	may	begin	a	custom	for	years	to	come.		Elsewhere	the	South	China	Sea	is	witnessing	its	own	issue	over	access	to	waters.	While	it	may	be	possible	to	portray	it	as	the	perennial	mare	clausum	vs	mare	liberum	issue,	arguably	more	is	at	stake.	Satellite	images	as	well	as	reports	from	local	fishermen	evidence	an	increased	presence	of	Chinese	military	in	the	region,	especially	in	the	Spratly	Islands,	documenting	a	growing	infrastructure	on	one	of	the	islands	which	provides	capacity	for	stationing	aircraft	as	well	as	boats.	China	is	challenging	the	validity	of	a	recent	ruling	of	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	which	answered	affirmatively	concerns	raised	by	the	Philippines	over	Chinese	claims	to	territory	and	maritime	resources,	which	is	demarcated	by	the	so-called	nine-dash	line.		Without	the	means	to	enforce	compliance	with	the	verdict,	hopes	of	the	Philippines	and	neighbouring	states	rest	on	their	strongest	ally,	the	USA.	The	USA	has	announced	a	shift	in	its	naval	focus	in	2015,	resulting	in	increased	availability	of	resources	and	a	strengthening	of	multilateral	connections	in	the	Pacific	Ocean	and	East	Asia	rather	than	the	Atlantic.	The	official	position	regarding	the	SCS	is	that	the	US	is	primarily	interested	in	upholding	the	principle	of	freedom	of	navigation.	The	US	Navy	preserves	the	right	by	establishing	custom	in	form	of	repeated	passages	of	the	SCS	and	neighbouring	waters	(and	indeed	around	the	globe)	through	its	Freedom	of	Navigation	operations.	It	thereby	upholds	provisions	such	as	UNCLOS	Article	87	(Freedom	of	the	High	Seas).		Yet	while	this	move	may	seem	to	strengthen	UNCLOS,	it	may	actually	be	bad	news	for	Philippine	fishermen	and	Canada	alike.	The	practice	is	a	confirmation	of	one	of	UNCLOS’s	core	articles,	yet	not	of	the	wider	procedural	framework	which	it	also	represents.	As	long	as	the	US	does	not	ratify	UNCLOS	and	embrace	the	full	range	of	its	norms	and	procedures,	it	is	somehow	strange	to	demand	that	the	ruling	of	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	be	respected.	Practices	of	navigational	freedom	in	the	NWP,	exercised	by	a	Chinese	vessel	with	American	tourists,	and	in	the	SCS,	as	emphasized	by	the	US	Navy,	can	ultimately	be	seen	to	undermine	UNCLOS,	leaving	key	provisions	of	the	law	of	the	sea	subject	to	a	pick-and-choose	approach.		In	its	pursuit	of	a	mare	liberum	approach,	the	US	appears	to	overlook	that	one	of	the	enabling	conditions	of	free	movement	of	commercial	vessels,	cruise	ships	and	its	navy	is	a	reliable	procedural	framework	that	offers	scope	for	managing	conflicts	through	which	freedoms	can	be	guaranteed	in	the	first	place.	The	huge	achievement	of	UNCLOS	lies	in	codifying	a	legal	order	that	converted	customary	norms	into	a	constitutional	framework	
and	in	identifying	ways	and	means	to	ensure	ongoing	debate	over	their	meaning.	It	makes	a	difference	whether	one	acknowledges	certain	principles	and	argues	in	their	favour	–	much	like	John	Seldon	did	for	mare	liberum	–	or	whether	one	acknowledges	that	these	are	no	longer	subject	to	negotiation	in	principle	outside	a	particular	normative	framework	such	as	provided	by	UNCLOS.		As	a	ratification	seems	unlikely	despite	widespread	support	the	USA	could	revert	to	the	Canadian	case	once	more	and	strengthen	UNCLOS	by	establishing	procedural	mechanisms	with	regard	to	the	NWP:	it	might	be	in	the	States’s	interest	to	acknowledge	
the	NWP	as	Canadian	internal	waters	after	all,	which	would	in	turn	strengthen	the	zonal	concepts	of	UNCLOS	as	well	as	principles	of	navigation	which	matter	in	the	SCS.	Such	a	recognition	of	the	NWP	as	internal	waters	of	Canada	could	be	negotiated	within	an	agreement	that	would	grant	US	access	and	transit	privileges,	while	Canada	would	most	likely	be	interested	in	a	joint,	coordinated	effort	to	enforce	a	monitoring	regime,	given	that	it	also	lacks	the	naval	capacity	to	do	so	on	its	own.	Whatever	the	details	of	such	an	outcome,	given	that	the	understanding	of	crucial	parts	of	UNCLOS	provisions	are	in	as	much	flux	as	the	state	of	matter	in	the	Arctic,	it	is	high	time	to	work	towards	achieving	clarity.		Hannes	Hansen-Magnusson	is	Lecturer	in	International	Relations	at	Cardiff	University	(contact	by	email:	Hansen-Magnusson”at”Cardiff.ac.uk	or	via	twitter:	@HansenMagnusson)	
